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This is a rejoinder to a criticism of Henderson (2008) by Alastair Smith. Our
conclusion is that Henderson’s basic case, although nicked around the edges by
developments since the original was written, still stands. Moreover, we point out
that Smith’s criticism of Henderson’s point that Fair Trade could help kill the banana
actually supports Henderson’s case. Finally, Smith’s proposed ‘trade, not aid’
solution does not contradict Henderson (2008). Refusing to buy Fair Trade coffee
and other products and, instead, buying quality coffee and other products would
not reduce trade, as Smith seems to imply.
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Introduction
In his response to Henderson (2008), Alastair
Smith (2009) makes a number of theoretical
and factual claims about both Fair Trade1 and
Henderson (2008). We agree with a few of
these claims and disagree with many. One of
the authors, Haight (formerly Berndt), did
substantial field work in Central America on
the issue of Fair Trade in coffee, which is why
she is a co-author of this article. The other,
Henderson, wrote the original article to which
Mr Smith responded. We examine, seriatim,
both Mr Smith’s own claims and his criticisms
of Henderson. Our conclusion is that
Henderson’s basic case, although nicked
around the edges by Mr Smith and, more
importantly, by developments since the
original was written, still stands.
Labour standards
The first substantive claim with which Mr
Smith takes issue is Henderson’s statement
that Fairtrade Labelling Organization (FLO)
certification ‘has only little to do with how it
treats its employees’. Mr Smith writes: ‘[T]he
sections covering Labour Conditions are in
fact one of the most detailed and considered’.
While it is true that there are standards,
monitoring of compliance is sporadic,
according to Michael Keaton of Transfair.2
Moreover, the protections that Fair Trade
offers are redundant. Both Costa Rica and
Guatemala have laws in place. In many cases,
just as for Fair Trade rules, the laws are only
intermittently enforced.
Mr Smith states:
‘far from taking labour conditions lightly, FLO
standards are based on those advocated by the
conventions of the International Labour
Organization (FLO, 2009, p. 23). In operationalising
this, FLO has embedded around 1,100 words on
labour standards (compared with the 600-odd
words covering Social Development of which the
issue of co-operatives, apparently so strongly
emphasised, is but one small section) in its Generic
Standards and set detailed requirements in the
areas of: employment policy; freedom from
discrimination; freedom of labour; freedom of
association and collective bargaining; conditions of
employment; and occupational health and safety.’
Mr Smith continues:
‘In contrast to other established labour codes, these
are largely not only applicable to full-time workers,
but in fact to “all waged employees of the producer
organization and of its members . . . [which]
includes migrant, temporary, seasonal,
sub-contracted and permanent workers” (FLO,
2009, p. 24).’
The document to which Mr Smith refers was
last revised on 1 January 2009. Of the
document’s 31 pages, seven are devoted to
labour conditions (as opposed to 11 for
environmental development, the longest
section). The opening paragraph lays out the
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expectation that organisations meet the standards of the
International Labour Organization, but does not describe
entirely what those requirements might be. Later in the
standards, however, certain sections of the ILO conventions
are specifically mentioned, leading a reasonable reader to
think that the important provisions of the ILO are presented
within the document and that one need not consult the ILO
further.
The preamble to the sections also points out that ‘[t]he
focus of the compliance criteria as set by the certifier will be
on the permanent workers’ (p. 24 of ‘Generic Standards for
Small Producers’ Organizations’). Because Fair Trade
regulations as they pertain to coffee farms restrict members to
only those family-owned and family-operated farms that are
‘not structurally dependent on permanent hired labour’ (p. 4),
the seasonal labourers who harvest the coffee are clearly not
the focus of the compliance criteria.
The first section of labour standards in this document gives
direction as to how to devise an employment policy, while also
specifying that there are no minimum requirements for an
employment policy (p. 24). Indeed, nowhere does it specify that
an employment policy is required. The second section pertains
to discrimination and sets out a comprehensive list of those
who constitute the ‘protected class’. The protected classes
include not only those protected by US law, but also such
categories as ‘social origin’ and ‘political opinion’. The third
section prohibits the use of forced labour and child labour. The
fourth provides for collective bargaining agreements. It is only
in the fifth and sixth sections that one finds an outline of
conditions of employment and safety.
One immediately notices in the section on conditions of
employment the provisions for wages, sick leave and overtime.
However, the fine print in each section suggests that the
organisation must comply with minimum-wage laws or, where
no such laws exist, must follow the industry standard. In other
words, Fair Trade provides for nothing new. The regulations
only echo those provisions already in place at the national and
industry level. The fact that Fair Trade firms must comply
with industry-level norms is significant, given that Fair
Trade-certified farms and co-operatives do not represent the
majority of producers in any Central American country. In
fact, by volume, Fair Trade coffee is just over 2% of the coffee
produced in Guatemala, the largest coffee-producing country
in Central America. In other words, Fair Trade firms must
comply with standards already set by an industry that is not
comprised mainly of Fair Trade firms. The safety requirements
are similarly impotent. They speak of ‘adequate’ safety
training, ‘adequate’ safety equipment, and working conditions
that are ‘as safe as reasonably practicable’. (pp. 30–31). Such
relative terms leave the door wide open to interpretation and
limit any organisation’s ability to measure compliance.
These standards are the Generic Standards. However, there
are also standards specific to certain products, such as coffee
and bananas. These standards do not mention employment
conditions, but, instead, focus on contracting guidelines for
the sale and export/import requirements.
Mr Smith writes:
‘More recently the FLO has also revised the definition of a “small
producer” to further ensure that producer realities are accurately
reflected in their Generic Standards. Two definitions are now offered
with one being applied to product categories that (1) are not (highly)
labour dependent and (2) are (highly) labour dependent (FLO, 2009, p.
4). In the second category it is now explicitly acknowledged that farmers
have the option to hire non-family labour so long as, “The number of
permanent hired workers does not exceed a specific factor per hectare
per crop, as defined by the certification body in its compliance criteria”
(FLO, 2009, p. 4). This means that while governance encourages
family-based entrepreneurship, it accepts that in some situations, some
families may need to make other provisions.’
Mr Smith is making our case. He points out, in his own
footnote 7, that coffee is in the first category; in other words,
coffee is in the category for which it is not explicitly
acknowledged that farmers may hire non-family labour.
Co-operatives
Mr Smith writes:
‘Henderson writes that “a substantial amount of the gains from the
Fairtrade price are eaten up by the co-operative bureaucracy”. While it is
not factually incorrect that a portion of the Fairtrade price remains with
the co-operative (and indeed that the Fairtrade price is guaranteed to
the first co-operative level only, and not to individual farmers), I wonder
why this must be described as being “eaten up by bureaucracy”, and not
perhaps, “absorbed in administrative and investment costs”?’ (emphasis
in original).
Because we see this as purely a semantic issue, we accept Mr
Smith’s change in wording.
Mr Smith points out, correctly, that the citation
Henderson offered to back up his claim about the gains being
eaten up by bureaucracy lead to ‘no relevant information on
the page indicated’. We apologise for the incorrect citation.
The correct citation is: Colleen E. H. Berndt, ‘Is Fair Trade in
Coffee Production Fair and Useful? Evidence from Costa Rica
and Guatemala and Implications for Policy’, Mercatus Policy
Series, Policy Comment No. 11, June 2007, p. 23. In it, Berndt
writes:
‘Does Fair Trade make a difference to the lives of the small farmer
through its premiums and pre-financing? According to the FLO, the
answer is an unqualified yes. “Fair Trade certification empowers farmers
and farm workers to lift themselves out of poverty.” The FLO’s web site
offers producer profiles, detailing, for example, how farmers in
Huehuetenango, Guatemala, are given scholarships to send their
children to school. Fedecocagua, the largest Fair Trade certified
cooperative in Guatemala, says this is not the whole story. “The premium
we use here [at the cooperative] . . . you saw our coffee lab, it is very
professional . . . But if I tried to give you the five cents from the Fair
Trade, just for you [meaning the small farmer], probably it’s nothing.”3
The representative went on to say that many organizations come to
Guatemala, build a school or clinic, and then take pictures for their Web
sites. In his experience, this was not a normal benefit of Fair Trade.’
Mr Smith states:
‘This efficiency critique also fails to appreciate that costs to invest in
Fairtrade certification are, in effect, voluntarily undertaken by
producers. FLO merely acts as an intermediary. Those responsible for
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their decisions, in effect, contribute towards a continual cost–benefit
analysis and if no gains are seen, or discovered over time, individuals
and indeed whole organisations are free to reject certification. In this
way, simply quoting the cost of certification for co-operatives is
irrelevant to an evaluation of the system without a co-nsideration of
either the returns available to individual co-operatives/farmers, or the
way that such licensing fees are subsequently spent by the FLO.’
We agree that people voluntarily undertake these actions.
Henderson (2008) did not state otherwise. His goal, and our
goal, is to inform the various participants so that they can
make good decisions.
Direct assistance or trade?
Henderson (2008) pointed out that people in richer countries
could better help people in poor countries by taking the extra
amount they would have spent on Fair Trade products and
giving it directly to those people. Mr Smith argues that trade is
better than aid and cites Adam and O’Connell (2004). There
are two problems with his citation of that article. Firstly, Adam
and O’Connell present a possibility theorem and a simulation;
they give no evidence. Secondly, even if trade is better than
aid, something that is plausible and probably true, that is
irrelevant to this debate. Henderson (2008) did not advocate
less trade: people who buy coffee will continue to buy coffee.
Rather, he argued against Fair Trade – that is, paying a higher
price for coffee produced under particular conditions. Indeed,
he agrees with the previously cited Berndt (2007) that
purchasing speciality coffee, rather than coffee produced
under particular Fair Trade conditions, benefits producers:
‘Because of the nature of specialty coffee cultivation, entrepreneurs who
engage in the high-quality production that consumers demand need to
pay high wages to attract skilled and efficient labor. By focusing on
quality, coffee outlets such as Allegro, Peet’s, and Starbucks are in fact
encouraging development and socially conscious business practices
through entrepreneurship. While this does not replace a faulty
institutional environment, it goes a long way to improve the lives of
small farmers by providing long-term, stable business ties between
coffee producers and coffee distributors [p. 30].’
Price floors and quality
Mr Smith does have one major critique of Henderson (2008)
that we accept. Henderson pointed out that the price floors
with Fair Trade are not the same as the price floors when
government sets them and stands ready to buy the surplus
production. With no organisation being willing to buy the
surplus, noted Henderson, any surplus would cause the
market price to fall. This point is true, but as Smith points out,
it is unlikely to be important because market participants are
aware of this danger.
Mr Smith writes:
‘Critics of Fair Trade usually argue that as producers will naturally sell
the best quality products to open markets, they will dump poor quality
goods on Fair Trade co-operatives which are assumed to have no quality
controls (Henderson, 2008, p. 63; Sidwell, 2008, p. 14). Again, this view
is often a product of theoretical deduction and bereft of empirical
evidence and is again, in my view, rather misleading for those making
decisions about the value of Fair Trade.’
Actually, Henderson did cite the paper by Berndt, which
contained the evidence. In that paper, she states:
‘While Transfair disputes that Fair Trade coffee is not a high-grade
specialty coffee, they acknowledge that farmers do tend to sell the best
of the harvest on the open market. Therefore, Fair Trade exposes the
industry to free rider problems. When a farmer delivers his Fair Trade
coffee beans to the cooperative for milling, they are mixed in with
everyone else’s beans. So any advantage in quality he might have is
diminished by the quality of the rest of the coffee. Thus, Fair Trade
inadvertently encourages mediocrity in production.’
Mr Smith admits in his footnote 14: ‘I have not reviewed the
report by C. E. H. Berndt, Does Fair Trade Coffee Help the Poor?,
as I have not been able to obtain a copy’. Surely Mr Smith’s
failure to obtain and read the cited article should not be
confused with Henderson’s not having cited evidence.
On a related note, Henderson (2008) drew specifically on
the concept of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968),
arguing that under Fair Trade, ‘since no one farmer is
responsible for the quality of coffee or gets credit for quality,
no farmer has a strong incentive to provide quality’. Mr Smith
challenges the standard economic analysis of a commons,
pointing out that even Hardin admitted that his article ‘should
have been called “The Tragedy of the Unmanaged Commons.” ’
Mr Smith is correct in saying that the problem with the
commons comes about when it is unmanaged – that is, when
no one restricts entry or usage. This is a good criticism of the
careless version of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ argument, but
it is not a valid criticism of the way Henderson (2008) used the
argument. In the case of coffee, someone managing a
commons to avoid the tragedy would give credit for quality.
But, as noted, farmers do not get credit for quality. Thus the
tragedy.
Mr Smith writes:
‘When analysis of value and quality are more sophisticated (Raynolds,
2000, p. 306; Zeithaml, 1988), it can be argued that Fair Trade
consumers are always getting improved quality given the additional
utility derived from social qualities. Instead of externalising everything
beyond physical characteristics, a fuller conception of value takes into
account the welfare of all stakeholders associated with the product, as
well as the “external preferences” of the consumer (Golding and Peattie,
2005, Mann, 2008): i.e. it accepts that even if utility from physical
satisfaction “might” (but not necessarily) be less, fulfilment from
making a social and environmental contribution cannot be forgotten in
analysing how preferences are being met.’
Mr Smith is correct. Again, though, we are seeking to inform
people, especially consumers, that some of the benefits that
they think they are creating are, in fact, not created. If their
subjective evaluation is based on the facts, then the facts we
produce are relevant. Indeed, Mr Smith must also think the
facts are relevant; otherwise, why would he even discuss them?
Fair Trade and GM
One of the main arguments in Henderson (2008) is
that because Fair Trade refuses the option to use
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genetically-modified organisms (GMOs), it threatens the
existence of bananas, a food that is very important in the diets
of many poor people. Mr Smith not only fails to damage
Henderson’s argument, but also admits key facts that are the
building blocks of the argument. He writes:
‘As Koeppel (2007) points out, bananas are among the most threatened
and disease-vulnerable crops in the world. They are also, by nature of
their biology, among the most difficult to conventionally breed. As a
consequence, developing a resistant banana by conventional breeding,
even if possible, can (and does) take decades. Genetic engineering might
cut that time by half, or even more. While this potential has
considerable commercial export value, perhaps a more important point
is the benefit that these measures could make to populations that
depend on bananas for most of their calories – across much of central
Africa, for example. For these reasons, Transgenic technology might
prove a significant benefit for bananas production, especially given that
once bananas have been grown, the prospects for diversification are very
limited given the effect that such crops have on the soil.’
This agrees with Henderson (2008). Mr Smith then continues:
‘For this reason, there might be grounds to argue that the FLO should
critically re-evaluate its current policy, but only where revision is based
on comprehensive knowledge and thorough analysis (and this is a view
shared by the European Union in maintaining a precautionary approach
to such technology).’
This way of thinking – revaluate the current policy only where
it is based on comprehensive knowledge and thorough analysis
– is precisely what would lead to the problem that Henderson
(2008) pointed out. How would the bureaucracy have
comprehensive knowledge? Waiting until the technology is
developed is likely to forestall its development. People who
make multi-million-dollar investments want to have some
assurance that their investment will pay off but they cannot
have that assurance if they do not know whether they will be
able to sell their product in the market. Depending on a
bureaucracy to decide that the knowledge is ‘comprehensive’
and the analysis is ‘thorough’ would rightly make many
investors nervous. Of course, Mr Smith could argue that too
small a percentage of the overall banana crop is produced
under Fair Trade to make this a big problem. That is a good
argument. But notice that, to the extent that the Fair Traders
succeed, it would be a bad argument.
In his conclusion, Mr Smith states that ‘it has not been my
intention to offer an argument explicitly in favour of Fair
Trade’. But he equivocates. In his very next sentence, he writes:
‘Overall I would urge those interested in these debates to continue to
support Fair Trade while at the same time remaining reflective and
critical in their approach – viewing the system as an excellent start in
need of reform.’
In other words, he claims that he has not argued in favour of
Fair Trade and yet asks us to ‘support Fair Trade’. We,
however, do not equivocate. We stand behind our case that
Fair Trade is not the most efficient way of helping farmers in
poor countries.
1. We distinguish Fair Trade, the set of specific business practices ordained by
those organisations operating under the umbrella of the Fairtrade Labelling
Organization, from the general concept of fair trade as embodying varied
interpretations of fairness in business relationships.
2. Berndt interview with Keaton, June 2005.
3. Gerardo Alberto de Leon (Manager, Fedecocagua), in discussion with the
author, 6 November, 2006.
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